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Abstract In my recent book Liberalism with Excellence (2017: chapter 7), I have
expounded at length a conception of warranted self-respect. That conception, which
draws heavily though far from uncritically on the scattered passages about self-
respect in the writings of John Rawls, is central to my defense of a variety of
liberalism that combines and transfigures certain aspects of Rawlsianism and per-
fectionism. However, it is also central to the positions taken in some earlier books of
mine on capital punishment and torture. (Kramer, The ethics of capital punishment,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Torture and moral integrity, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2014) Although my understanding of warranted self-
respect was presented far more briefly or obliquely in each of those earlier books
than in Liberalism with Excellence, it in fact underlies both my limited defense of
the death penalty and my absolutist insistence that the use of interrogational torture
is never morally permissible. The present paper will recount the gist of my con-
ception of warranted self-respect and will then explain how that conception fig-
ures pivotally in my ruminations on the diverse matters of political morality that
have been mentioned here.
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However, it is also central to the positions taken in some earlier books of mine on
capital punishment and torture. (Kramer, The ethics of capital punishment, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2011; Torture and moral integrity, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2014) Although my understanding of warranted self-respect was
presented far more briefly or obliquely in each of those earlier books than in
Liberalism with Excellence, it in fact underlies both my limited defense of the death
penalty and my absolutist insistence that the use of interrogational torture is never
morally permissible. The present paper will recount the gist of my conception of
warranted self-respect and will then explain how that conception figures pivotally in
my ruminations on the diverse matters of political morality that have been
mentioned here.
1 Warranted Self-Respect as Warranted Self-Esteem
Let us begin with a famous passage from John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971:
440):
We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First of
all,…it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that
his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second,
self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s
power, to fulfill one’s intentions. When we feel that our plans are of little
value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution.
Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavors. It is
clear then why self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may seem
worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for
them.
Although this passage is in need of some modifications and qualifications and
amplifications, it elegantly conveys several of the key elements in my own account
of warranted self-respect. Rawls was correct in declaring that self-respect is best
understood as self-esteem which comprises both self-worth (a sense that one’s
projects and objectives are valuable) and self-confidence (a sense that one will be
able to do many of the things which one sets out to do).
Rawls has been criticized by some commentators for running together the notion
of self-respect with the supposedly distinct notion of self-esteem. Such commen-
tators usually hold that self-respect consists in a sense of oneself as an agent who
should always be treated as an end and never solely as a means, whereas self-esteem
consists in a favorable appraisal of one’s own accomplishments or talents or projects
or attractiveness or personality or relationships. Those critics maintain that the
paramount primary good that should have been identified by Rawls as such is self-
respect in the Kantian sense just indicated, rather than self-esteem. However, as I
have argued at length in Liberalism with Excellence (2017: 300–322), any
objections to Rawls along these lines are inapposite—partly because self-respect in
the Kantian sense is always a component of self-esteem, and partly because self-
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esteem is what fully partakes of the features that led Rawls to classify it as a primary
good.
Of course, although self-respect as self-esteem (or, rather, warranted self-respect
as warranted self-esteem) is a primary good, it is a primary natural good rather than
a primary social good.1 In other words, it is never a distribuendum directly
apportioned by any system of governance. Instead, it is like health or intelligence as
a desideratum which should be fostered by a system of governance but which cannot
be directly controlled in its distribution by any such system. Governmental
functionaries can never ensure that each person in a society will harbor an ample
sense of self-respect, nor can they ensure that each person would be warranted in
harboring such a sense.
One way in which the quoted remarks by Rawls stand in need of amplification is
signaled by what has just been said. Rawls focused on self-respect as a primary
good—indeed as the most important of the primary goods—but he should instead
have focused on warranted self-respect. Whereas self-respect is fundamentally a
psychological property, warranted self-respect is fundamentally ethical as well as
psychological. It is the level of self-esteem that is appropriate in response to one’s
successes and failures and abilities and aspirations and relationships. Although the
level of self-respect actually felt by anyone is a subjective property, the
warrantedness or unwarrantedness of that level of self-respect is an objective
ethical matter. (Note that the unwarrantedness of someone’s sense of self-respect
can be in the direction either of excess or of deficiency. A person can deludedly
overestimate her achievements or other admirable qualities, but alternatively she
can assess those achievements and qualities too negatively.)
2 A Government’s Responsibility to Promote Warranted Self-Respect
Although the preceding section furnishes only the barest sketch of a much longer
exposition in my 2017 book, it is sufficient for the purposes of this article. We
should now ponder the role of a government in promoting the incidence of
warrantedly high levels of self-respect among the people in the society over which
the government presides. As has already been indicated, that role does not involve
any direct distribution of levels of warranted self-respect. Warranted self-respect is
a primary natural good rather than a primary social good. Instead of treating it as a
distribuendum, a system of governance is morally obligated to bring about the
political and socioeconomic conditions under which every member of a society can
be warranted in feeling an ample sense of self-respect.
Of course, as has been stated, no system of governance can ensure that every
member of a society will indeed harbor an ample sense of self-respect; nor can any
such system ensure that every member will be warranted in harboring such a sense.
Like the level of health enjoyed by any particular individual, the level of self-
respect experienced by her is determined by numerous contingencies of her
1 On the distinction between primary social goods and primary natural goods, see Rawls (1971: 62). See
also Kramer (2017: 325–328).
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biography and temperament. Similarly, the level of self-respect that would be
warranted for any particular individual is determined by numerous contingencies of
her biography and abilities as well as by socioeconomic and political conditions.
(My references here to a person’s biography naturally encompass her relationships
with other people.) Because the quantum of actual self-respect and the quantum of
warranted self-respect for each person are so heavily dependent on the peculiarities
of her circumstances, no system of governance is morally obligated to bring about a
situation where everyone is warranted in harboring an ample degree of self-respect
which he or she actually harbors. Such a situation can fail to obtain—indeed, it will
scarcely ever obtain—even if a system of governance has fulfilled all its
responsibilities.
What a system of governance is morally obligated to do, however, is to bring
about the socioeconomic and political conditions under which every member of a
society can be warranted in feeling a solid sense of self-respect. Dependent though
levels of warranted self-respect are on the particularities of individuals’ lives, they
are also determined crucially by the general socioeconomic and political arrange-
ments over which a government can exert substantial influence. Rawls explored in
depth the connections between such arrangements and the incidence of the primary
good of self-respect; the aspirational perfectionism which I defend in Liberalism
with Excellence concentrates even more wide-rangingly on those connections.
Appropriate socioeconomic and political institutions are not alone sufficient to
enable every person to be warranted in sustaining a high level of self-respect, but for
any ordinary person they are a necessary condition for being so warranted. Thus,
every system of governance is morally obligated to develop and uphold such
institutions. I will henceforth use the phrase ‘‘foremost responsibility’’ to refer to
this moral obligation which is incumbent on every system of governance.
3 Aspirational Perfectionism Versus Edificatory Perfectionism
Although the influence of socioeconomic and political arrangements on people’s
warranted levels of self-respect is multifaceted, Liberalism with Excellence chiefly
addresses two main forms of that influence. The book’s first engagement with the
matter occurs in its confrontation with edificatory perfectionism. Edificatory
perfectionism comprises a diverse array of theories whose proponents maintain
that—at least in principle—governments are sometimes morally permitted and
morally obligated to steer people toward ways of life that are more flourishing or
upright or wholesome or successful or robustly autonomous. According to such
philosophers, governments are morally permitted and morally obligated to
undertake arrangements that will induce people to edify themselves by developing
and exerting their capacities. Liberalism with Excellence contends that, insofar as a
society’s political institutions act for the purpose of edifying individuals rather than
for the purpose of preventing injustices or fostering prosperity and public order and
other public goods, those institutions will not be supportive of warrantedly high
levels of self-respect (chapter 6). Such an effect will be especially pronounced if the
governmental actions involve coercion or manipulation, but it will occur even if
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those actions consist solely in positive enticements such as subsidies or tax
exemptions. For two main reasons, the adoption of any such measures for the
purpose of edifying the citizenry is contrary to a government’s foremost
responsibility. Those measures tarnish the relationship between citizens and
governmental functionaries, for they are based on officiously derogatory judgments
akin to those that animate the meddlesomeness of a busybody; and they demean the
system of governance by tying the success of its operations partly to matters that
would be beneath its notice if it concerned itself not with citizens’ harmless foibles
but with its own foremost responsibility.
The effects of edificatory policies are scarcely the only nexus between
socioeconomic or political conditions and the warranted levels of self-respect of
individuals. In addition, my alternative variety of perfectionism—aspirational
perfectionism—is centered on the ways in which the excellence of a society bolsters
the levels of self-respect that individuals are warranted in sustaining. People very
often do take pride in the accomplishments of their contemporaries and predecessors
as well as in their own accomplishments, and they are frequently warranted in doing
so. Vicarious pride is frequently warranted because the life of virtually every
individual unfolds in networks of relationships that bear importantly on how well
that life has gone.2 Given that such pride is frequently warranted, the foremost
responsibility of a government will include a responsibility to foster the occurrence
of outstanding achievements. Those outstanding achievements help to endow with
excellence the society over which a government presides, and they thereby
contribute to the government’s fulfillment of its foremost responsibility—since the
members of the society can warrantedly feel better about themselves by dint of
warrantedly feeling better about their status as such members. Conversely, the
members of a meanly unaccomplished society can be warranted in feeling worse
about themselves inasmuch as they are warranted in feeling abashed about their
status as such members.
Of course, the foregoing two paragraphs provide no more than an extremely
skimpy outline of aspirational perfectionism. The assertions in those paragraphs
have not been supported here by any relevant argumentation. However, because I
have presented the relevant argumentation at length in Liberalism with Excellence,
and because my purpose here is simply to sketch how the foremost responsibility of
any system of governance is central to aspirational perfectionism, the remarks in the
foregoing two paragraphs are sufficient.
Before we turn to the death penalty and to torture, however, one caveat should be
entered. Although the cultivation of sterling accomplishments in areas such as art
and literature and science and athletics can be crucial for the fulfillment of a
government’s foremost responsibility, the securing of people’s basic rights and
liberties is even more important as a measure by which a government satisfies that
responsibility. If the securing of people’s basic rights and liberties is itself
understood as a mode of excellence—as Rawls took it to be in A Theory of Justice,
2 As should be evident, the notion of how well a life goes is understood here in what Derek Parfit termed
an ‘‘objective-list’’ sense. (Parfit 1984: 499) Such an understanding is singularly appropriate in
ruminations on the objective warrantedness of levels of self-respect.
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and as I take it to be in Liberalism with Excellence—it is the paramount
aspirational-perfectionist objective which any system of governance is morally
obligated to realize. If aspirational perfectionism is instead construed more narrowly
to comprehend all modes of excellence except for the securing of people’s basic
rights and liberties, then aspirational-perfectionist policies are subordinate to the
policies whereby those rights and liberties are protected. Whatever position anybody
adopts on that matter of taxonomy,3 the key point is that the upholding of basic
rights and liberties and the fostering of other modes of excellence are the means by
which a system of governance meets its foremost responsibility. Albeit the
nurturance of outstanding feats in areas such as art and literature and science and
athletics is always lexically posterior to the effectuation of the basic rights and
liberties of individuals, it too is generally constitutive of the conditions under which
each individual can be warranted in sustaining an ample quantum of self-respect.
4 The Purgative Rationale for the Death Penalty
Though most of the chapters in my book The Ethics of Capital Punishment (2011)
are devoted to assailing all the standard rationales for the death penalty, the
penultimate chapter of the book expounds an alternative rationale that applies in a
very limited range of cases. Biblical in origin but strictly secular in my exposition,
the purgative rationale maintains that the life of someone who perpetrates
extravagantly evil crimes is ethically dominated by those crimes and is therefore
an affront to humanity. The continued existence of someone who has committed
such atrocities will defile the moral character of the society in which he or she
abides. Though the officials who govern that society may not have been complicit in
the perpetration of those atrocities, they become and remain complicit in the
continuation of the life of the perpetrator—insofar as they have gained control over
him or should have gained control over him. By failing or refusing to execute such a
person after fair legal proceedings (including opportunities for appeals), a system of
governance becomes defiled. That defilement impairs a government’s compliance
with its foremost responsibility.
Although the assertions in the preceding paragraph have merely gestured toward
the complex arguments that underlie the purgative rationale, and although those
assertions have not addressed any of the objections which I ponder in my 2011 book
and in a subsequent article (Kramer 2015), my concern here is simply to expand
somewhat on the point stated in the final sentence of that paragraph. Why would the
continuation of the life of a defilingly evil wrongdoer impede the realization of the
3 It is a taxonomical matter rather than a substantive matter because it does not concern any of the
following questions, each of which is to be answered affirmatively: (1) whether the effectuation of
individuals’ basic rights and liberties is a morally obligatory and vital endeavor for every system of
governance; (2) whether the fostering of excellent accomplishments in areas such as the arts and sciences
is typically a morally obligatory endeavor for a system of governance; (3) whether the principle of justice
that makes the former endeavor obligatory is lexically prior to the principle of justice that makes the latter
endeavor obligatory. Instead, the sole matter at issue—a taxonomical matter—is whether aspirational
perfectionism encompasses only the latter endeavor or also the former endeavor.
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political and socioeconomic conditions under which everyone in a society can be
warranted in feeling an ample sense of self-respect? Let us mull over an analogy.4
Suppose that Mary has been horrifically persecuted by John. He has brutally
tortured and decapitated her husband and children, and he has repeatedly raped and
tortured her while keeping her chained for months to the wall of an appalling
dungeon. When he is eventually apprehended, he shows no contrition whatsoever;
like Aaron in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, he regrets only that he has been
captured and that he therefore cannot commit further atrocities. Not long after his
arrest, he becomes seriously ill. The lone course of action that can save his life is a
transfusion of blood, and the sole person in the region with blood of a type that will
be accepted by John’s body is Mary. Patently, Mary is not under a moral obligation
to donate any blood to sustain the life of John. More interesting is the question
whether she is under an ethical obligation to decline to sustain his life. The answer
to that latter question is affirmative. In the circumstances just outlined, where John
has subjected Mary and her husband and children to a string of gruesome outrages
and has undergone no remorse, she would debase herself if she were to take any
steps to prolong his life. An ethic of ostensible magnanimity in these extreme
circumstances would be an ethic of self-contempt.
Admittedly, the analogy in the preceding paragraph has to be handled with
caution. Mary’s situation differs in some significant respects from the situation of
the officials in a system of criminal justice who have to determine how a monstrous
offender such as John is to be punished. Nevertheless, because the chief differences
cut in contrary directions, the analogy proves to be quite serviceable.
On the one hand, if Mary declines to donate any blood, she has not killed John
through an active endeavor. Rather, she has let him die. In that regard, her course of
conduct is not akin to the steps taken by legal officials when they execute a capital
offender. Under any credible reckoning, those steps by the officials are actions
rather than omissions. Now, for reasons that can be gathered from my discussions of
the act/omission dichotomy elsewhere5—discussions to which I shall return in my
remarks on interrogational torture later in this article—any ethical considerations
sufficient to underlie an obligation-to-terminate-somebody’s-life-through-an-omis-
sion might not be sufficient to underlie an obligation-to-terminate-somebody’s-life-
through-an-action. Ceteris paribus, the considerations that minimally suffice to
underlie the existence of an obligation of the latter kind are weightier than those that
minimally suffice to underlie the existence of an obligation of the former kind.
Consequently, this first main dissimilarity between Mary’s situation and the
situation of the criminal-justice officials is a factor that calls for wariness. When we
start with a premise about her being under an obligation to forbear from preserving
John’s life, we are well advised to be cautious about inferring therefrom that the
officials are under obligations to execute monstrous offenders such as John.
On the other hand, Mary is a private individual who has been directly victimized
by John’s dreadful crimes. If she declines to donate any blood to save John’s life,
4 This analogy is borrowed—with some important modifications—from Kramer (2015: 387–388).
5 See especially Kramer (2014: 77–97, 193–196, 202). My discussions there draw quite heavily at times
on my earlier exposition of the act/omission dichotomy in Kramer (2003: 324–335).
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moreover, she will not have reached her decision in order to defend herself or
anyone else against his onslaughts; his onslaughts have already been halted. An
active endeavor by her to terminate his life or to immure him as a prisoner, outside
any contexts in which she is defending herself or others against imminent dangers,
would be unlawful and morally illegitimate (though of course understandable). Any
such endeavor, outside such contexts, would consist in the pursuit of vengeance
rather than in the pursuit of justice. Officials in a system of criminal law, by
contrast, are positioned to pursue justice from an impartial perspective. They act on
behalf of their community, and in extreme cases on behalf of humankind. They can
legitimately undertake punitive measures that would not be legitimate if undertaken
by Mary or by any other private individual acting in a private capacity. The range of
punishments which they can legitimately impose is far from unlimited, of course,
but it includes a number of active punitive endeavors.
In short, because these two principal dissimilarities between Mary’s decision and
a sentencing decision by a criminal-justice official cut in opposite directions, my
scenario of Mary and John can well serve the purpose for which I have adduced it.
That is, it presents an extreme situation in which a person’s choosing to extend
somebody else’s life would move the person away from the conditions under which
she can be warranted in harboring an ample sense of self-respect. It would amount
to a form of self-abasement and thus to a wrong against herself. If the officials in a
system of criminal justice balk at the execution of a monstrous offender and decide
that instead resources should be devoted to prolonging his life,6 they likewise
detract from the conditions under which every member of their society can be
warranted in feeling an ample sense of self-respect. Whereas Mary through the
donation of blood to John will have breached a duty of elementary respect which she
owes to herself, the officials through a decision against an execution (after fair legal
proceedings) will have breached a duty which they owe to members of the public at
large. In an extreme case where a defendant has committed a medley of loathsome
atrocities that render his life an affront to humankind, a judgment with the effect of
allocating resources to the continuation of his life is a course of action that hinders
the efforts of a government to fulfill its foremost responsibility.
Naturally, my connecting of the purgative rationale for capital punishment to the
foremost responsibility of any system of governance will not be of great interest
unless the purgative rationale is sound. In the present article, I have laconically
summarized that rationale instead of propounding arguments in support of it (though
the analogy involving John and Mary, notwithstanding its imperfections, does
supply a wee bit of support). However, the task of sustaining the purgative rationale
with suitable lines of argumentation is precisely what I have pursued in The Ethics
of Capital Punishment. Here the much more limited task has been to show how that
rationale fits together nicely with the positions taken in some of my recent books on
quite different topics. What unifies my approaches to those topics is their shared
grounding in the foremost responsibility of every system of governance.
6 Of course, the officials will have decided to punish him through some alternative sanction such as
lifelong incarceration or banishment. However, a corollary of punishing him in some alternative fashion
is that resources will be devoted to continuing his life. This point applies even if the funding for those
resources can be obtained through the seizure of assets that belong to the offender.
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5 Torture and Warranted Self-Respect
In Torture and Moral Integrity (2014), I have maintained that interrogational torture
and other familiar modes of torture are always and everywhere morally wrong. That
is, any instance of such torture is in contravention of a moral prohibition to which
there are no exceptions. To be sure, in some formidably rare circumstances the duty
contravened by an instance of torture might be less stringent than a countervailing
duty to proceed therewith in order to avert a calamity. Still, the reason why any such
situation would consist in a moral conflict—a conflict between a duty to u and a
simultaneous duty not to u—is that neither of the clashing duties in the conflict is
canceled or suspended by the clash. Each of them continues to exist as a moral duty.
Consequently, even in the extreme circumstances where the perpetration of
interrogational torture would be less gravely wrong than the remissness of declining
to perpetrate it, it would be a serious wrong. Its wrongness would be extenuated, but
not eliminated, by the exigency of the circumstances.
To discern how my absolutist position on the use of interrogational torture is
connected to my focus on a government’s foremost responsibility, we need to
consider briefly why the use of such torture is always and everywhere wrong.
Because my 2014 book distinguishes among many different types of torture, and
because the details of my reflections on the wrongness of torture vary across those
different types, we should also briefly probe the wrongness of another type of
torture: punitive torture. We can thereby see that the absolute wrongness of punitive
torture, like the absolute wrongness of interrogational torture, is integrally linked to
the foremost responsibility of every system of governance. Though the specifics of
the factors that account for the wrongness of torture are somewhat different across
the distinct kinds of torture, the wrongness in each case pertains directly to the
impairment of the political and socioeconomic conditions under which every
member of a society can be warranted in harboring a hearty sense of self-respect.
5.1 Interrogational Torture
A full account of the wrongness of interrogational torture would require a separate
article. Within the highly limited compass of this subsection, the easiest way to
approach the matter of the wrongness of such torture is to draw a contrast with a
quite different type of torture. Although nearly all kinds of torture are always and
everywhere morally wrong, two kinds can be morally permissible in some extreme
circumstances. Most notable for my present purposes is that some possible instances
of ephemerally incapacitative torture are morally permissible. (Kramer 2014:
186–187; 2017: 260–261) The phrase ‘‘ephemerally incapacitative torture’’ refers
here to the deliberate affliction of a malefactor with severe pain for the purpose of
inducing him to desist from his ongoing performance of a very seriously wrongful
action, where the harmful effects of the torture are neither intended to last
permanently nor likely to last permanently. If the infliction of the severe pain is the
least harmful means that is feasible as a way of preventing the completion of the
seriously wrongful action, it can be morally legitimate.
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Consider, for example, the following scenario which recounts a variant of a
situation broached initially by Uwe Steinhoff and discussed at some length by me in
my book on torture. (Kramer 2014: 87–88; Steinhoff 2009: 44) When a rapist assails
a young woman and begins to tear her clothes off, she manages to stomp on his foot
with one of her stiletto heels three or four times in order to afflict him with exquisite
pain. Her hope is that the searingness of the pain will induce him to desist from his
act of rape, as he loses his ability to concentrate on his ravishing of her and is
instead absorbed by the consumingness of his own agony. He does indeed
involuntarily cease to clutch her, and she escapes from her plight while he writhes in
anguish. Her wielding of ephemerally incapacitative torture has been unequivocally
permissible in the circumstances.
Now, if we train our attention solely on the interests of the victim of the
ephemerally incapacitative torture, we shall be unable to explain why the young
woman’s act is morally permissible whereas no act of interrogational torture is ever
morally permissible.7 After all, even though the harmful effects of her stomping on
the rapist’s foot are neither intended to persist permanently nor likely to persist
permanently, those effects—which might include some broken bones or other
significant injuries as well as the agony—are undoubtedly more severe than the
harmful effects of some instances of interrogational torture. Thus, if we analyze the
situation from a victim-focused perspective that concentrates on the interests of a
tortured person in being free from excruciating pain and injuries, we will not be able
to fathom the following combination of facts: (1) the fact that the young woman’s
repelling of her attacker through the deliberate infliction of severe pain is morally
permissible, and (2) the fact that the deliberate infliction of severe pain for the
purpose of extracting information that can help to avert some calamity is never
morally permissible. The combination of those two facts will be baffling from a
victim-focused perspective, since some instances of calamity-averting interroga-
tional torture foreseeably cause less damage to the interests of their victims than the
damage foreseeably caused by the young woman’s use of ephemerally incapaci-
tative torture.
Consequently, to grasp why the wrongness of interrogational torture is absolute
whereas the wrongness of ephemerally incapacitative torture is not, we need to shift
to a viewpoint focused on the moral probity of the perpetrator. When we switch to
such a viewpoint, we can see that a pivotal matter for differentiating between the
morality of interrogational torture and the morality of ephemerally incapacitative
torture is the act/omission distinction. While torture of the former kind is aimed at
inducing an information–imparting action, torture of the latter kind is aimed at
inducing an omission by thwarting a seriously wrongful action. Given as much, and
given the demarcation of the act/omission dichotomy—which is expounded
rigorously and sustainedly in my book on torture (2014: 77–97, 193–196)—torture
7 To forestall any misunderstandings, I should note that the victim of the ephemerally incapacitative
torture is the perpetrator of the crime of rape whereas the perpetrator of the torture is the victim of the
crime of rape. Because my distinction here between a victim-focused perspective and a perpetrator-
focused perspective is drawn in relation to the torture rather than in relation to the rape, the person
relevantly classifiable as the perpetrator is the young woman while the person relevantly classifiable as
the victim is her assailant.
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of the former kind is far more minutely controlling, with far more fine-grained
direction of the victim’s behavior, than is torture of the latter kind. Hence, the
outlook associated with the perpetration of torture of the former kind is always
overweening in ways in which the outlook associated with the perpetration of
torture of the latter kind is not. Some instances of ephemerally incapacitative torture
are consistent with an ethic of self-restraint, whereas every instance of interroga-
tional torture is not.
Of course, the preceding paragraph does no more than to supply a pre´cis of one of
the relevant lines of argument in my 2014 book, instead of elaborating any full-
blown argumentation here. However, the specifics of that lengthy line of
reasoning—and in particular the complexities of drawing the act/omission
distinction rigorously—are well beyond the scope of the present paper. My point
at the moment is simply to underscore the significance of a shift from a victim-
focused perspective to a perpetrator-focused perspective. Only from that latter
perspective, with its concentration on the moral integrity of the perpetrator(s) of
torture, does the morally decisive difference between interrogational torture and
ephemerally incapacitative torture become visible. Torture of either type can set
back the interests of victims as much as torture of the other type, but the
perpetration of interrogational torture involves extravagantly god-like controlling-
ness that is not similarly characteristic of the perpetration of ephemerally
incapacitative torture. That perpetrator-focused divergence between those two
kinds of torture, which a purely victim-focused perspective neglects, is the key to
the absolute wrongness of interrogational torture and the variability of the moral
status of ephemerally incapacitative torture.
If an instance of interrogational torture is performed by anyone who is acting on
behalf of a system of governance (as an official or as a private contractor, for
example), it detracts from the political conditions under which every member of a
society can be warranted in harboring a solid sense of self-respect. Its impairment of
those conditions is similar in a key respect to the impairment of those conditions by
edificatory-perfectionist policies. In each case, some measures undertaken by a
government’s officials or by others acting on its behalf are so overweening as to
counter its fulfillment of its foremost responsibility. To the extent that a system of
governance forgoes the self-restraint that befits its relationship with members of the
public, it moves away from discharging its foremost responsibility.
Of course, notwithstanding the major affinity just highlighted, there are some
notable dissimilarities between the wrongness of interrogational torture and the
wrongness of edificatory-perfectionist policies. If an instance of interrogational
torture is performed in the absence of a dreadful emergency that extenuates the
immorality of its occurrence, the gravity of the wrongness of such torture will far
exceed the gravity of the wrongness of any edificatory-perfectionist policy that is
likely to be adopted in a modern liberal democracy. Even in the presence of a dire
emergency, the perpetration of interrogational torture will typically be a consid-
erably graver wrong than will any credible edificatory-perfectionist endeavors. Still,
despite that obvious disparity and some further divergences, my focus on the
foremost responsibility of any system of governance is conducive to our discerning
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a deep point of homology between the wrongness of interrogational torture and the
wrongness of edificatory perfectionism.
5.2 Punitive Torture
Although punitive torture shares most of the conspicuous features of interrogational
torture—not least the deliberate infliction of severe pain—it is undertaken for a
different purpose. Instead of using severe pain as a means of extracting information,
a perpetrator of punitive torture uses it as a means of disciplining a person who is
thought to have committed some serious misdeeds. (Of course, although those
purposes are distinct, they are combinable.) The wrongness of punitive torture is
flagrant in circumstances where no harsh sanction at all is appropriate, but such
torture is wrong even in circumstances where an extravagantly evil malefactor
deserves to undergo it. We should mull over a situation of the latter sort, in order to
apprehend why punitive torture is always and everywhere wrong.
Suppose that Josef Mengele—directly responsible for hundreds of thousands of
deaths and gruesome atrocities at Auschwitz—had been captured and brought to
justice after the Second World War instead of being sheltered by Argentina and
Paraguay and Brazil. Given that Mengele had perpetrated thousands of acts of grisly
torture, the subjection of him to punitive torture would have been richly deserved.
Nonetheless, he had a moral right not to be subjected to such torture. That right was
justificatorily traceable not to the importance of his interest in being free from
excruciating pain—an interest that was of no positive ethical weight whatsoever—
but instead to the importance of upholding the moral integrity of any system of
governance whose officials had managed to arrest and convict him. By stooping to
afflict Mengele with the torture which he thoroughly deserved, the officials in that
system of governance would have degraded its moral integrity and their own moral
integrity by using the system’s punitive mechanisms to cater to urges for revenge.
Though Mengele could legitimately have been executed and should have been
executed, the subjection of him to torture would have turned the process of
punishment into an enterprise of vindictive self-indulgence. He deserved no better;
still, had a system of governance eschewed all normal restraints for the purpose of
giving him torturously what he deserved, it would have debased itself by vengefully
effecting a qualitative correspondence between its punitive responses and some of
his iniquities. However understandable and primally satisfying such responses
would have been, they would have overstepped the bounds within which a system of
governance must remain if it is to differentiate its own workings from the gross
unrestraint to which its punitive measures are addressed. Thus, Mengele had a moral
right not to be subjected to punitive torture, even though his interest in being free
from excruciating pain did not contribute at all to the justification for his having
such a right. Justificatorily, that right was entirely derivative of the moral duties
borne by the officials who might have captured Mengele. Its justification lay in the
furtherance of their moral probity rather than in the furtherance of his well-being.8
8 For more detailed argumentation—perpetrator-focused argumentation—about the moral illegitimacy of
punitive torture, see Kramer (2014: 203–209).
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In presenting a general combination of self-aggrandizement and self-abasement,
the wrongness of punitive torture is parallel to the wrongness of edificatory
perfectionism and the wrongness of interrogational torture. On the one hand, the
perpetration of torture as a mode of punishment exceeds the proper bounds of
government in the way that has just been touched upon. On the other hand, the self-
aggrandizement of such a course of action for any system of governance is also self-
abasing as a manifestation of ethical weakness. A system of governance healthy
enough to abide by an ethic of self-restraint would operate its punitive mechanisms
without inclining its citizens and officials to derive gratification from the agony of
other people. Given that the derivation of gratification from the extreme anguish of
other people is a form of sadism, a system of governance that caters to such an
impulse is acting ignominiously.
Insofar as a system of governance does exhibit this pattern of simultaneous self-
aggrandizement and self-abasement by stooping to the perpetration of punitive
torture, it undermines the political conditions under which every member of its
society can be warranted in harboring a firm sense of self-respect. Notwithstanding
that many members of the society may derive gratification from the wielding of
torture against someone as hideously evil as Mengele, the experiencing of that
gratification by anybody will have lowered the level of self-respect which she is
warranted in feeling. After all, as I have argued at greater length elsewhere (2017:
286–288), one’s derivation of pleasure from the agony of somebody else is both
overweening and degrading. It is overweening because it is grounded on the
proposition that the excruciating pain of someone else can fitly be enjoyed as a
plaything for one’s amusement. To adopt such an attitude is to emulate the cruelty
of a malignant deity and is thus to act at odds with the fundamental equality between
oneself and other mortals who are prone to feelings of anguish. At the same time,
one’s derivation of pleasure from the agony of someone else is demeaning because
it indicates that one’s own strengths and sustenance and successes—including one’s
triumphs over foes—are insufficient for one’s contentment, which consequently has
to be bolstered through one’s awareness of the extreme suffering with which
somebody else has been afflicted. Pro tanto, one’s outlook is marked by inadequacy.
(Note that I am not here propounding an empirical conjecture. Specifically, I am not
surmising that everyone inclined to experience gratification from the perpetration of
punitive torture against a monstrous evildoer is lacking in self-esteem as a property
that can be gauged through psychological testing of some kind. Though such an
empirical hypothesis may well be correct, my observation here is conceptual rather
than empirical. My point is that nobody would be favorably disposed toward
punitive torture as a source of gratification if the contentment derived by him from
his strengths and sustenance and successes left him in no need of further
gratification.)
Thus, far from bolstering the level of self-respect that each member of a society
is warranted in harboring, the perpetration of punitive torture by a system of
governance lowers that level. Because the use of such torture bespeaks both the
presumptuousness and the degradedness of the system of governance that has not
refrained therefrom, it is contrary to the system’s foremost responsibility. It runs
athwart the political conditions under which everyone can be warranted in cleaving
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to an ample sense of self-respect. In that regard—though obviously not in a number
of other ways—punitive torture resembles edificatory perfectionism.
6 Conclusion
This paper has not sought to advance arguments which establish that edificatory
perfectionism, interrogational torture, punitive torture, and the preservation of the
lives of extravagantly evil offenders are morally wrong in ways that detract from a
government’s fulfillment of its foremost responsibility. Rather, I have merely
glanced at the arguments presented in three of my recent books. My purpose here
has lain not in re-elaborating those arguments but instead in underlining the
connectedness of their disparate foci. Diverse though the topics of the aforemen-
tioned books are, my treatment of each topic is situated within a general orientation
toward the political conditions under which every member of a society can be
warranted in feeling a hearty sense of self-respect.
That orientation can also salutarily inform one’s enquiries into other major issues
of political morality. In some books to be written during the next several years, I
will extend it to debates over freedom of speech, abortion, and general principles of
justice. Of course, the fact that those future books of mine will be linked to three of
my recent books through their underlying outlook is not due to the availability of
some template or algorithm that would extend the outlook mechanically. On the
contrary, the substance of the argumentation in each of those future tomes will vary
markedly from one tome to the next, just as the lines of reasoning in my book on
capital punishment differ strikingly from the lines of reasoning in my book on
torture or my book on liberal perfectionism. Nevertheless, what will be common to
them is their affirmation that some crucial limits on legitimate governmental action
and some crucial reasons for governmental action are located in the foremost
responsibility of any system of governance. Diverse though those limits and reasons
are in sundry contexts of disputation over matters of political morality, they all stem
from the value of warranted self-respect.
What makes that shared orientation so significant is that it comprehends quite a
few of the positions in contemporary political philosophy. Its provenance lies in
certain Stoical ideas, but my development of it has been influenced even more by
Rawls’s reflections on self-respect as the most important of the primary goods.
While encompassing the Kantian ideal of self-respect that consists in the upholding
of one’s own status as a deliberative agent, my orientation reaches further—in line
with Rawls’s reflections—to encompass the aspects of self-worth and self-
confidence that go beyond one’s recognition of oneself as an agent. My focus on
the warrantedness of self-respect aligns my orientation with one of the central
propositions of liberal perfectionism (namely, the proposition that judgments about
excellence should inform some exertions of governmental power), as does the way
in which I amplify the idea of the social bases of self-respect. Consequently, the
outlook distilled in this article not only can form connections among multifarious
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issues of political morality but also can form connections among multifarious
schools of thought in political philosophy.9
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